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This article, which is based on a keynote speech for an urban panel at the Journal of 
Southern African Studies’ conference on ‘Southern Africa beyond the West’, 
compares urban experiences in the region of southern Africa with those in the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Urban processes are complex and wide 
ranging, and comparative analysis necessarily must focus on specific aspects. The 
focus here is on cities as places where people live and work and on their welfare and 
livelihoods.  The analysis emphasises the importance of  accounting for different 
starting points and thus of historical factors, policy environments, changing modes of 
production and ideologies.  A key argument is that the concept of path dependence --  
including the timing of key developmental phases such as the attainment of 
independence in relation to global shifts in economic ideology – helps to explain some 
of the differences in development policies and their impacts on urban livelihoods.  It 
is also argued that while contemporary comparative analysis has been facilitated by 
the increased hegemony of capitalism, a key influence on the welfare of urban 
populations in the different countries under consideration has been the very varied 
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ways in which states have been able, and have chosen, to intervene in market-
determined outcomes in cities in BRIC countries and in southern Africa.  
 
Introduction 
 
There are many different ways of thinking about cities.  Evidently they are essential 
nodal points in national and global economies.  They are centres of production and 
finance; they channel trade, the lifeblood of the global economy.  They are physical 
built entities which represent specific local histories and cultural norms, and national 
and international architectural  trends, as well as the imprint of planners and building 
laws.  And towns are also places and all have unique aspects derived from where they 
are.  Thus, as geographers still like to mention from time to time, they have particular 
central place functions, and benefits and limitations on their potential functions 
derived from their geography. 
 
So when  comparing cities in southern African countries and those in the 
BRIC countries it is hard to know where to start. With production? With planning? 
With political histories?  Here I choose to look at them mainly as places where people 
live and to think about them in terms of the variable outcomes for those urban 
residents, and for their welfare, of the forces already mentioned – the global and local 
economic trends, the political forces, the help and hindrances from planners and 
plans.   To what extent are most urban residents able to meet their basic needs and 
more? And what trends are in place – are things getting better or worse and why?    
 
Urban Processes and Modes of Production  
 
When one uses the lens of people’s welfare to study cities, issues which influence 
their livelihoods and their incomes and the costs of urban living come to the fore.   At 
the mega-scale the underlying force in different societies is the dominant mode of 
production and the accompanying social relations which emanate from it.  If one 
thinks of the societies under discussion here, back in the 1970s the picture was this:  
Russia was communist, highly industrialised and urban; China was communist and 
primarily rural, with strong controls on urbanisation and migration; much of Latin 
 3 
America including Brazil was basically under fascist rule, supported and often created 
by the United States of America for its own political and economic advantage;  India 
was (and still is) the world’s largest democracy but extremely poor and extremely 
rural; and up until 1975 half of the ten countries of southern Africa were still under 
white settler rule, and were engaged in various types of liberation struggle.  The other 
half had only experienced about a decade of independent rule, and every single one 
was landlocked which posed a fundamental developmental constraint, especially in a 
region where transit route countries were hostile and/or experiencing violent conflict.1  
 
Thus, to put it mildly, the starting points of the urban trajectories of the 
societies under comparative examination differed extraordinarily.  It is salutary to 
keep this in mind because when comparing current urban outcomes it is all too easy to 
focus only on the ‘now’ and contemporary political economic forces, when to 
understand the real pertinence of the comparisons also requires consideration of how 
these different societies got to where they are and how they started out. 
 
One of the biggest shapers of different outcomes for urban people is now gone 
because all the societies under consideration are capitalist now.  Urban outcomes 
shaped under communism, as in China and Russia, were extraordinarily different 
from those possible under capitalism, so the general convergence of global modes of 
production almost everywhere toward some form of capitalism from about 1990 has 
altered the comparative framework in crucial ways.  Another key difference, related to 
the demise of communism, is the sharp acceleration since the 1970s in the process of 
globalisation which had, of course, begun many centuries before.  All of the countries 
under consideration and their various cities now operate in  a world where trade has 
been strongly liberalised; in the 1970s this was definitely not the picture.  At that time 
Latin American dependista theorists busily expounded theories about why no less 
developed society and urban economy could possibly truly ‘develop’ because forces 
of unfair economic competition, backed up by political influence and if necessary 
military action, from the Global North made it impossible.  The answer, for them, was 
strong state protection and support of urban economies and policies of import 
                                                
1 J. Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (London, Catholic Institute for International 
Relations in collaboration with James Currey, 1986). 
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substitution industrialisation2 – strategies which had helped the Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs) of the Far East on to their rapid development path by this decade --  
and from there to break into export industrialisation. 
 
Those old-fashioned development strategies had profound implications for 
cities and their workforces.  The basic point is that they created large numbers of jobs 
which were urban-located, urban-based, formal sector jobs in higher value-added 
sectors – particularly in manufacturing. In sub-Saharan Africa, the first phase of 
independence – the 1960s - ushered in policies influenced by these theories, and 
modernisation theories more generally, all of which assumed a central role for 
urbanisation and industrialisation.  Their goal was economic transformation which 
had to include urban-based, higher value-added production, as fast as possible, no 
matter whether or not the newly independent  nations had any comparative advantage 
in global competitive terms in these areas.  
 
The global hegemony of liberalised trade and neoliberal policies since the end 
of the 1970s has made this route to developing a mature, urban-based economy 
almost impossible now, in my view.  Most development advice from the world’s 
development agencies since the 1980s, backed up by conditionality of access to 
international finance, has been the antithesis: trade liberalisation and the structural 
adjustment of economies towards production based on countries’ ‘natural’ 
comparative advantage, with  resources allocated by market forces.  In Africa this 
generally meant adjustment back towards primary commodity exporting.   
 
If a country were going to make it down the urban industrialising route over 
recent decades, then it needed to have been well down it already by 1980 and/or be 
globally competitive in the production and export of manufactured goods.   In other 
words, it should not be a country in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries also have 
bargaining power on the global economic stage, and in relation to the world’s 
financial institutions, when they are globally significant in terms of their populations, 
labour forces and markets – that is, being like India or China.  That sort of option is 
                                                
2 See, for example, A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York and London, Monthly Review 
Press, 1969). 
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not open to smaller, weaker countries -- that is being like Zambia, or Malawi, let 
alone Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland.   
 
So what does this all mean when comparing the cities of southern Africa with 
those of the BRIC countries?  In all cases, the capacity of southern African states to 
derive benefits from this global situation which would boost the welfare, employment 
and incomes of their urban populations – and thus bring about real urban 
‘development’ as opposed to economic growth per se -- has proved to be extremely 
different from the BRIC countries, with the exception of Russia. It is worth 
emphasising that South Africa is very definitely not excluded from this comparative 
point, despite its evidently higher level of development in many ways.  Russia’s urban 
experience in the medium term after its full exposure to the ‘winds’ of globalisation 
and liberalised trade had many parallels with that of sub-Saharan African countries as 
it also experienced massive falls in human welfare, including rising death rates, and 
de-industrialisation in the 1990s due to the same structural forces.3 I also believe that 
the developmental problems faced by urban communities in southern Africa were 
entirely predictable. 
 
Path Dependence and ‘Timing’: The Impact on Urban Economies  
 
I find it impossible to explain the extraordinary differences between the urban 
outcomes in the past century in Asian, Latin American and African countries, without 
reference to the idea of path dependence.  Asian countries had been implementing 
their ‘modernising’ policies for far longer than African countries, before liberalising.  
Having attained independence in the immediate post-war period, they had had a 
generation (20 years or so) of ‘modernisation’ before many African colonies even 
began their own programmes in the 1960s.  China’s path differed but it had certainly 
‘modernised’, if in a sometimes terrifying way.  Africa had far less time to implement 
such policies and, within that continent, the southern African region was worst placed 
of all in relation to the historical phasing of these crucial changes.  Basically, southern 
Africa’s timing has been terrible. 
                                                
3 M. Bradshaw and A. Stenning (eds), East and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union: The Post-Socialist States 
(Harlow, Pearson, 2004); D. Stuckler, D. King and M. McKee, 'Mass Privatisation and the Post-Communist Mortality Crisis: 
A Cross-National Analysis', The Lancet, 373, 9661, (2009), pp. 399–407.  
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Partly the problem stems from how long it took southern African countries to 
attain independence due to white minority rule.  South Africa is different as it became 
independent in 1910 but evidently, in relation to the issues under discussion here – 
urban development and welfare outcomes for the majority of its urban and rural 
people -- South Africa chose a highly peculiar and inhumane development path.  
Nonetheless, once released from the constraints of colonial rule South Africa was able 
to develop modern infrastructure and an industrial base through strategic investments 
and significant state involvement.   
 
In fact, only two southern African countries, Zambia and Malawi, experienced 
the usual ‘African’ post-colonial development strategies.  Indeed, Zambia’s economic 
and urban trajectories mirrored those in other sub-Saharan Africa countries in the 
1960s, a decade of global economic boom, and into the 1970s: that is it urbanised 
incredibly fast, and urban incomes, on average, increased significantly.  It was among 
the very fastest urbanisers in sub-Saharan Africa at that point.  Although Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland decolonised in the 1960s, too, they remained so bound up 
with the South African economy -- including using its currency, being members of the 
South African Customs Union and engaging deeply with its migrant labour system -- 
and also have such tiny populations, that their early post-colonial developmental 
experiences are not generalisable.  However,  for Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
and Namibia, which fought for independence and did not attained it until much later, 
there was no time at all for their new governments to start down their own 
modernising paths before the combination of the oil and debt crises of the 1970s 
hurried them into the second post-colonial phase of liberalised and structurally 
adjusted economies. These four countries had experienced some modernising 
economic development under colonial (or, in Namibia’s case, South African) rule, 
particularly in the latter decades of that rule.  Zimbabwe’s economy, in particular, had 
experienced investment in key infrastructure and strategic industries, often by the 
white minority-ruled state in the first instance.  The Rhodesian state’s relative 
autonomy from the British Colonial Office from the 1920s resulted in parallels with 
South Africa, as this meant that government economic policies could largely avoid the 
constraints on structural modernisation imposed by the different economic 
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imperatives of ‘normal’ colonial rule.  However, the key point is that none of the 
subsequent independent governments had time to consolidate their structural 
modernisation because donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) had 
switched their support and advice to the neoliberal norms of liberalised trade and 
limited government involvement in economies.4 
 
Throughout Africa during the era of structural adjustment, policies, education,  
health systems and infrastructure fell apart, economies de-industrialised and per capita 
incomes declined.  Even the strongest proponents of neoliberalism at the time, such as 
the World Bank, now accept that the 1980s was a lost decade for ‘development’ in 
sub-Saharan Africa, but for much of southern Africa it was much worse. To play fast 
and loose with the experience of Alice at the Mad Hatter’s Tea Party, in the 1980s the 
countries in this region were being told they could not have more cake when, as yet, 
they had hardly had any. 
 
But in Asia, and, obviously, particularly in China, ‘strategic’ economic 
liberalisation meant many countries could have their urban development cake and eat 
it, because their comparative ‘advantage’ lay in industrial manufacturing. They had  
huge workforces -- which by the 1980s had become somewhat, or even relatively well 
educated --  and improved and improving infrastructure, and so their ‘natural’ 
development path now lay in industrialisation and urbanisation.  They could out-
compete the West in many industries, and modernisation was assured.  
 
In comparative urban studies many scholars resist the ‘big picture’ argument 
so far outlined, understandably.  It is an obvious generalisation and while we 
academics spend part of our lives seeking useful generalisations in order to make 
sense of the world, we also like to spend the other half picking those generalisations 
apart and arguing that they do not capture the ‘lived realities’ of city X or society Y.  
Both approaches have their strengths and play a role in progressing our various 
                                                
4 On the ideological battle over Zimbabwe’s urban-based economic policies in the 1980s, which the IFIs eventually won, see 
C. Stoneman, 'The World Bank and the IMF in Zimbabwe', in B. Campbell and J. Loxley (eds), Structural Adjustment in 
Africa (London, James Currey, 1989), and R. Riddell, 'Zimbabwe' in R. Riddell (ed.), Manufacturing Africa: Performance 
and Prospects of Seven Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (London, James Currey; Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 
1990).  On these issues for sub-Saharan Africa generally, see R. Riddell, 'The Future of the Manufacturing Sector in Sub-
Saharan Africa' in T. M. Callaghy and J. Ravenhill (eds), Hemmed In (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993) and for 
the southern African region specifically, see C. Stoneman, 'Structural Adjustment in Eastern and Southern Africa: The 
Tragedy of Development' in D. Potts and T. Bowyer-Bower (eds), Eastern and Southern Africa: Development Challenges in 
a Volatile Region (Harlow, Pearsons, 2004). 
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disciplines.  But I think the arguments against the generalised view outlined above 
also stem -- among those of us who hoped for something different for the societies of 
southern and sub-Saharan Africa -- from reluctance to accept that we lost that round.    
There is no doubt that capitalism has become more hegemonic and more unregulated 
and more powerful than it was in the middle of the last century.  This is so depressing 
that we sometimes have to ignore it, or focus on something more positive like the 
many hope-inspiring aspects of contemporary activism and resistance against the 
worst outcomes.5  In addition it must always be recognised that many urban people, 
and sectors, and workers, in all of the countries under consideration have benefited 
from trade liberalisation.  China has obviously been transformed by becoming a more 
open economy; it is probably the world’s big winner from the process of global trade 
liberalisation (much to the chagrin of Global North societies and their workforces).6  
But there are also many beneficiaries in the urban areas of southern Africa, some of 
whom also come from countries like China or Brazil.  And, quite rightly, many 
studies and analyses precisely focus on those outcomes in the southern African 
region, including in the pages of the Journal of Southern African Studies, and in many 
of the contributions to the Journal’s 2015 conference on ‘Southern Africa beyond the 
West’.  
 
Different ‘Types’ of Capitalism and Urban Outcomes 
 
But another mediator of the ‘big picture generalisation’ that shapes the outcomes for 
urbanism is the nature of the capitalism practised in different countries.  In other 
words, different types of capitalism affect urban people differently.  In 2012 Jenny 
Robinson and Susan Parnell published a paper on comparative urbanism which was 
                                                
5 Among the many academics in southern Africa who do combine scholarly analysis with the promotion of social 
activism is Patrick Bond, previously the Director of the Centre for Civil Society in Durban, and now at the 
University of Witwatersrand.  He attended the conference where I presented the keynote speech upon which this 
article is based.  Even as I spoke, he was emailing me to remind me of the importance of social activism and civil 
protest, which he felt I should have emphasised more in my speech.  
6 Since this speech was originally written, there has been a referendum in the United Kingdom over membership of the 
European Union, which ended in a vote to leave.  This event and some of the political trends in the rest of Europe and the 
USA in 2016, including, notably, Donald Trump’s win in the American presidential elections, are frequently argued to be 
expressions of the discontent of significant proportions of their populations with the outcomes of ‘globalisation’ for 
themselves.  In turn this has lead to more recognition in public discourse in the Global North that the costs and benefits of 
economic globalisation are very unequally experienced within societies there, as well as between them, and that this has 
political repercussions.  As yet, however, it is rather rarer for explicit comparisons to be made between the fate of the urban 
Global North and urban sub-Saharan Africa as the world’s economies and employment sectors have been reshaped by these 
forces.  One exception, which is evident in the title of the book, is J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, Theory from the South: 
Or, How Euro-America is Evolving toward Africa (Boulder, CO, Paradigm Publishers, 2012). 
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much influenced by their own experiences of urbanism in southern Africa.7  In this 
they argued that the endless focus on neoliberalism in many analyses in contemporary 
urban studies was limiting and often misleading.  Their view was that:  
 
recent work on neoliberalism, ….. [needs]  to be ‘provincialized’ in order to create intellectual 
space for alternative ideas that may be more relevant to cities where the majority of the world’s 
urban population now resides.8  
 
One can sympathise with their point that it is no use blaming everything on 
neoliberalism, and that place and the historical moment must always be factored in – 
as indeed my arguments above have emphasised. But I would maintain that one still 
has always to factor in how the mode of production – that is, capitalism -- shapes 
cities.  The two views are not entirely at odds when it is recognised that neoliberalism 
is not a mode of production -- it is just the currently dominant ‘brand’ of capitalism.  
It helps to remember that much essential theorising about urbanisation under 
capitalism and its outcomes for ordinary urban people was done before the1980s9 and 
even were we somehow to return to a more regulated and less globally liberalised type 
of capitalism, those issues would remain.  But sometimes it seems that the system is 
now so hegemonic that, as Gramsci would predict, we almost forget how it constrains 
the options and protects the most powerful.   
 
Thus Robinson and Parnell go on to say that: 
 
In our view, theories of urban neoliberalization need to encompass the idea that neoliberalism 
may be a partial, absent or even irrelevant driver of urban poverty, rather than a ubiquitous 
frame.10   
 
I would not disagree with this.  However, if one substitutes ‘capitalism’ for 
‘neoliberalism’ in that sentence I am not sure I would agree because I think capitalism 
is, currently,  the ‘ubiquitous frame’. 
 
                                                
7 S. Parnell and J. Robinson, '(Re)Theorizing Cities from the Global South: Looking Beyond Neoliberalism', Urban 
Geography, 33, 4 (2012), pp. 593--617.  
8 Ibid., p. 593. 
9 For example, D. Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Athens and London, University of Georgia Press, 1973); M. Castells, 
The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (London, Edward Arnold [Alan Sheridan, translator], 1977); M. Castells, City, 
Class and Power (New York, St. Martins Press, 1978). 
10 Robinson and Parnell, ‘(Re)-theorizing Cities’, p. 601. 
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My counterpoint to such arguments therefore would be that analyses of urban 
outcomes for people’s welfare must never set aside the essential power of the 
institutions of capitalism, be it in its neoliberal or one of its more regulated modes or 
phases – that is the dominance of big corporate agency and private sector interests, of 
the profit motive, of stock markets, of the protection of the private property of the 
wealthy.11  The point is to recognise that these remain key forces even though the 
capitalism practised in each country and affecting each urban system is differentiated 
by the state.  
 
Having said this, nevertheless the state still can and does have a significant 
effect.   First of all, some countries are more neoliberal than others.  Indeed,  some (in 
particular, China, as Padraig Carmody has noted)12 are not neoliberal at all.  For in 
any definition of neoliberal capitalism the power of the state relative to the power of 
market forces has to be a core element,  and capitalism in the Chinese state is often 
precisely that: Chinese state capitalism.  That is, the state remains extremely 
powerful, willing, determined and capable of shaping the Chinese economy.  The 
irony is, therefore, that the country which has perhaps most benefited from the 
contemporary neoliberal era is the one that has practised real neoliberalism the least.13    
 
And governments in southern African countries also affect urban outcomes.  
However, big differences characterise the ways in which they are positioned on the 
factors listed above in relation to China: how much power they actually have to buck 
market forces (that is, their capacity), and basically whether they care to do so (that is, 
their willingness), and, if they do, in whose interests do they intervene?  Can they, and 
do they wish to, boost the welfare of ordinary urban residents ? 
 
State Mediation of Urban Outcomes 
 
                                                
11 A strong argument for ‘meaningful dialogue’ between structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to African urban 
studies for improved understandings of contemporary African urban realities is made in a recent intervention by David 
Simon, with particular reference to environmental issues. See D. Simon, 'Uncertain Times, Contested Resources: Discursive 
Practices and Lived Realities in African Urban Environments', City, 19, 2-3 (2015), pp. 216--38. 
12 Carmody made this point in his own keynote speech at the JSAS conference in 2015.  See P. Carmody in this 
volum.e 
13 Of course this is only an irony for those who actually believe that leaving economic changes to the vagaries of 
unmitigated market forces is the best way forward. 
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In this area of urban studies the ‘big picture’ becomes the backdrop to urban welfare 
outcomes, and local factors become increasingly important.   Some of the most 
interesting areas of urban studies are about how the state can ameliorate the impacts 
of raw capitalism in the world’s towns and cities, or how the state can be persuaded or 
cajoled so to do. In contemporary development parlance, which is nowadays shaped 
by both rural development studies and the lexicon of climate change and disaster 
studies, what can the state do to make urban households’ livelihoods less vulnerable 
and more resilient?   For urban households can be particularly vulnerable, since cities 
are where the ultimate vulnerabilities of being cogs in the machine of capitalist 
productive forces are experienced for those of its residents who belong to the 
proletariat.   
 
Of course, very famously in southern African societies since the nineteenth 
century, the nature of cities has been shaped by the semi-proletarianisation of many 
urban workers.  Forced to maintain some links to rural land, they had no permanent 
‘rights to the city’ – again, to use contemporary academic parlance.14  This was, 
originally, for very specific reasons, connnected with the unjust imperatives of white 
settler states.  But the outcomes in terms of divided families are not unique to 
southern Africa.  Today an interesting comparative urban issue related to the 
conference theme of ‘Southern Africa beyond the West’ is the ways in which both old 
and new patterns of migration to southern African cities compare and contrast with 
China’s internal migration patterns and its citizen registration system, the hukou 
system, which places constraints on the ‘rights to the city’ of hundreds of millions of 
urban workers in that country. I will return to this point shortly.    
 
My own work for decades has been tracing the ways in which urban workers’ 
rural links have waxed and waned since the frameworks enforcing them were 
dismantled.15  The fact that they have actually ‘waxed’ or strengthened at times in 
                                                
14 This term as currently used in urban studies is usually traced to the original work of H. Lefebvre, Le Droit À La 
Ville (Paris, Anthropos [2nd ed], 1968) and, in his words, refers to a ‘demand...[for] a transformed and renewed 
access to urban life’.  It relates to all and any urban residents and thus goes far beyond the longstanding (and, in 
context, understandable) preoccupation of southern Africanist scholars with the rights of migrants to cities.  The 
concept is sometimes used by urban popular movements, including Abahlali baseMjondolo, South Africa’s shack 
dweller movement.  It was written into Brazilian federal law under the City Statute law of 2001 and also into the 
New Urban Agenda adopted by world leaders at Habitat III in October 2016. 
15 For example, D. Potts, ‘''Shall We Go Home?” Increasing Urban Poverty in African Cities and Migration Processes', 
Geographical Journal, 161, 3 (1995), pp. 245--64;  D. Potts, Circular Migration in Zimbabwe and Contemporary Sub-
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many African countries, including in southern Africa, is testament to the significance 
of understanding cities in  terms of people’s welfare, in terms of their incomes and 
their livelihoods, and not in terms of economic growth data or how many new 
shopping malls have been developed.  The key point is that the links have 
strengthened in countries when urban vulnerabilities became too overwhelming,  and 
when even the ingenuity of workers in the informal sector was tested too far by 
desperate falls in urban purchasing power and service provision.16  In other words, 
ultimately these links have provided the economic security net that capitalist cities do 
not provide to those who have not heeded the mantra of the urban worker: do not get 
ill, do not get old, do not get injured and, I might add, do not get retrenched because 
global competition has closed down your factory. 
 
But this is where the state comes in.  In wealthy societies in the Global North, 
there is a strong welfare state derived from the post-war social contract struck 
between the electorate, capital and the state.   A security net was designed to limit the 
worst aspects of capitalist urban societies where people can be made destitute by 
unemployment, illness, disability or old age.  The systems are, of course, now under 
attack and, if we want to see how quickly urban populations’ fates can alter when the 
full seriousness of being truly proletarianised reappears in Europe, one has only to 
look to Greece today.17  And, if one is a member of a society in the Global North, be 
very afraid….. 
 
In southern Africa those state-backed systems were not in place under 
colonialism (except for white settlers, of course), nor afterwards in most countries on 
any meaningful scale – that is, one that made much difference to the livelihood 
choices of most urban residents.  But interestingly, now they are appearing and they 
are making a difference to cities, and to urban people, in South Africa, in Botswana,  
in Namibia.  There are pensions in those countries for all old people.18 They are not 
large enough to make for a comfortable living, but they are enough to make old 
                                                                                                                                       
Saharan Africa (Oxford, James Currey, 2010). 
16 D. Potts, 'The Slowing of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Urbanization: Evidence and Implications for Urban Livelihoods', 
Environment and Urbanization, 21, 1 (2009), pp. 253--9. 
17 See, for example, T. M. Mitrakos, 'Inequality, Poverty and Social Welfare in Greece: Distributional Effects of Austerity', 
Hellenic Studies, 22, 1 (2014), pp. 65--94; M. Gkartzios, ‘“Leaving Athens”: Narratives of Counterurbanisation in Times of 
Crisis’, Journal of Rural Studies, 32,[[issue number?]] (2013), pp. 158--67. THERE IS NO ISSUE NUMBER FOR THIS 
JNL. I HAVE DOUBLE CHECKED 
18 This is also true of Lesotho but the pensions are only for those over 70, which limits their effectiveness. 
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people a very important income resource – sometimes even the only such resource -- 
for millions of households.19  There are child and disability grants too.  These changes 
are fundamental and life-changing for urban (and rural) households.  In South Africa 
there were four million social grant recipients in 1994; by August 2014 there were 
16.3 million.  The grants accounted for 4 per cent of GDP in around 2008 – a very 
high rate for a developing country, and the proportion has since risen further.20 By 
2015-16 the grants accounted for 14.3 per cent of the government budget, about the 
same as health.  SALDRU (South African Labour Development Research Unit) 
estimates that the pension is enough to lift ‘many households out of the poorest 
quintile’.21  A quarter of South Africa’s unemployed now live in households that 
exclusively derive their income from social grants paid to other household members. 
The child grant has improved school attendance and child health. According to the 
Brookings Institute, for South Africa ‘the inequality-reducing effects of the social 
grants system cannot be over-stated’. 22 
 
One can have no doubt therefore that South Africa’s welfare net is making a 
difference to urban households and their livelihoods. That is a very good thing and 
must not be ignored.23  Thus, we have two antithetical urban policy narratives about 
post-1994 South Africa: the country went down the neoliberal route and has lost out to 
international competition for urban productive employment, undermining the national 
economy and human welfare; or it has created one of the most successful and 
comprehensive welfare systems in the developing world.  The outcomes of this 
combination for urban processes and livelihoods are very interesting. On the one hand, 
there really is a horrendous shortfall of formal sector jobs for the now mainly urbanised 
population, and the country has deindustrialised apace.  In 2002 manufacturing 
accounted for 20 per cent of GDP; by 2012 it was under 14 per cent.24  On the other 
                                                
19 S. Devereux, 'Social Pensions in Southern Africa in the Twentieth Century', Journal of Southern African Studies, 33, 3 
(2007), pp. 539–60; J. Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution (Durham, N.C., Duke 
University Press, 2015); S. Levine, B. Roberts, J. May, H. Bhorat, J.-Y. Duclos, E. Thorbecke and A. Araar, A Review of 
Poverty and Inequality in Namibia (Windhoek, Namibian Central Bureau of Statistics and the National Planning 
Commission, 2009). 
20 See Africa Check. Factsheet: Social grants in South Africa – Separating Myth From Reality (2015), 
https://africacheck.org/factsheets/separating-myth-from-reality-a-guide-to-social-grants-in-south-africa/ 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See, for example, the analysis in A. Goebel, '"Our Struggle Is for the Full Loaf": Protests, Social Welfare and Gendered 
Citizenship in South Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, 37, 2 (2011), pp. 369--88. 
24 Data cited in publicity for a meeting at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in February 2012 on South African 
manufacturing, which also noted that the sector was ‘struggling to compete against lesser cost and at times more 
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hand, urban people’s livelihood security has improved.  Yet the confounding factor of 
urban housing costs for a family means that many households remain divided – not 
necessarily between rural and urban areas however, but often now with families in low-
income planned housing areas, or informal unplanned ones, at the edges of the cities or 
in another cheaper town, whilst a worker lives in shared, rented accommodation nearer 
where she or he can earn some money.  This is a reshaping of the old, ‘weird’ South 
African urban patterns (although, given current trends in the world’s biggest cities 
everywhere, this may not be so weird any longer). The inconvenient geographies of 
housing are proving very hard to address despite democratic South Africa’s significant 
investment in low-income housing.  Between 1994 and 2014 the government had 
provided 2.84 million RDP25 houses for those on the lowest incomes and 903,000 
serviced sites.26 
 
Brazil has also gone down this welfarist route.  In particular it is renowned for 
its Bolsa Familia programme, providing cash to poor, food insecure households on 
the condition that children attend school and get vaccinated. This was begun in 2003 
(after South Africa’s strengthening of its welfare programme) and has had 
transformative effects on urban welfare outcomes and inequality.  When I attended 
the World Urban Forum in 2012 I was impressed by how many South American 
countries had also embarked on low-income housing programmes and projects in the 
past decade or so, the success of which depended ultimately on significant elements 
of state subsidy. 
 
India has also introduced some notable urban interventions.  In 2013 it passed 
a law to extend its existing rural food security programmes to urban areas, and 
estimates suggested half the urban population could benefit:27 that would be around 
190 million people.  But this was a landmark decision in another and bigger way -- 
                                                                                                                                       
agile competitors …… [and it posed the question] Can South Africa compete against Asia?’ (Africa Frontiers 
Forum,  Publicity flyer for seminar on ‘Will Special Economic Zones rescue manufacturing in South African and 
the region?’ 2012). 
25 These are  named after the Reconstruction and Development Programme which ran for two years after 1994; this 
was then replaced by the much more market-oriented GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) 
programme. 
26L. Donnelly, State to tackle housing title deed mess, Mail and  Guardian, August 1 2014.  
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-31-state-to-tackle-housing-title-deed-mess/ 
27 See, for example, M. Pati, How Secure Is India’s National Food Security Act? [[is this a book, article? Should it be 
italicised?]] (Bengaluru, Institute of Public Health, 2015), http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/blog/2015/09/how-secure-is-indias-
national-food-security-act/.   
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because it was a key reason why the 2014 Bali WTO trade liberalisation talks 
collapsed, as India insisted on holding on to this crucial food security programme and 
its plan to expand it to urban areas.  In other words,  this was a really big global 
moment for urban welfare and livelihood security because it involved successful 
resistance against a key institution of neoliberal capitalism.28  I would argue this has 
become a ‘watch this space’ episode in the field of comparative urbanism. 
 
The Economist and the Financial Times, and other key outlets of neoliberal 
economics, were very negative about India’s decision.29   However, their dismal 
analyses of India’s food security policies missed a crucial connection to a compelling 
livelihood resilience ‘fact’ which I find makes nearly all those studying urban Africa 
take a step back.  This is that in March 2013 one in seven Americans was on food 
vouchers, up from one in nine in 2011.  The point I am making is that the mitigating 
factor in the interactions between  capitalism, cities, proletarians, low incomes, 
hungry people and unsustainable families is some sort of state support. This is not a 
Global South versus Global North urban issue: this is the world’s urban issue.  
 
And how about China?  When thinking about migration and urbanisation this 
offers perhaps the most interesting comparisons with southern Africa, as noted earlier. 
During communism there were really serious restrictions on rural-urban migration.  
Then, as the economy opened up, there was a shift to relying on the  hukou system –  
so people were  free to move but their right to remain in town as an urban citizen was 
prevented.  Therefore permanent urbanisation and family migration are limited by 
constraining rights to the urban social welfare system and state-provided 
infrastructure for education and health.30  Some changes in this system are now being 
introduced, particularly in smaller cities and for more skilled migrants.  If we compare 
this with South Africa’s urban history, the system has parallels with South Africa’s 
post-Riekert Commission urbanisation at the end of the 1970s – which accepted the 
need for urban insiders (with Section 10 rights).  But the full political and economic 
                                                
28 This is not to say that the societies of the Global South opposed further trade liberalisation at this round.  
However, continued protectionism on the part of the Global North societies, of their agricultural markets in 
particular, was a major stumbling block.  
29 For example, 'Bailing Out From Bali: World Trade', The Economist, August 9, (2014), p. 58; S. Donnan and A. Kazmin, 
‘Indian Objections Sinks WTO DEAL’, Financial Times, 31 July 2014. 
30 See, for example, T. Miller, China's Urban Billion: The Story Behind the Biggest Migration in Human History (London, 
Zed Books, 2012). 
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implications of free migration were understood to be incompatible with maintaining  
white minority rule, so the rest remaind subject to influx controls.  But given that in 
China there is freedom to migrate,  perhaps the system there today is more of a ‘mash 
up’ of South Africa’s post-Riekert system and the short-lived post-1986 ‘end of influx 
control’ orderly urbanisation regime which was dubbed by some as the right to move 
but not the right to stop moving.   
 
Registration systems (which had their roots in feudal migration controls) were 
also used to control permanent residence in the Soviet Union’s largest cities.  As with 
apartheid pass laws employers were not meant to give jobs to those without a local 
registration (propiska).  One crucial difference, however, was that a propiska was tied 
up with a constitutional right to be provided with a dwelling in the area of 
registration.  Since the end of communism some elements of registration systems 
remain but their implementation is much rarer; the main targets for such controls now 
are ‘foreigners’.31 Since many of these ‘foreigners’ would  have been Soviet citizens 
before the break up of the Soviet Union, the situation is the antithesis of the post-
apartheid system in South Africa where those previously assigned by the apartheid 
state to  Bantustans/homelands, and treated almost as foreigners in their own country, 
became full citizens after the abolishment of the Bantustan system and influx controls. 
 
Returning to the comparisons with contemporary Chinese urbanisation, 
housing outcomes can also be interestingly compared with those in South Africa.  
There are some remarkable parallels but also some marked differences. Millions of 
single migrant workers are housed in hostels in Chinese cities but unlike in the old 
hostel system in southern Africa, many of them are women.  Millions of others live in 
dire, overcrowded rented accommodation in some of the older residential areas of the 
cities – more akin perhaps to the situation in inner-city Johannesburg.  However,  in 
central Johannesburg many migrants are international.  Some peripheral high-rise 
hostel blocks in China are actually owned by previous rural villagers who are allowed 
to construct these as part of the compensation they receive when their land is taken for 
urban development. They then rent them out to migrant workers.  This is a formal, 
legal process and the architecture is different but there are parallels with the sub-
                                                
31 See A. White, ‘Internal Migration Trends in Soviet and Post-Soviet European Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 59, 
6 (2007), pp. 887-911. 
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division of smallholder rural land under indigenous tenure, near many southern 
African cities, for sale or rent to urban residents desperate for housing – from the 
villages around Gaborone where most of its urban population growth now occurs, to 
Inanda in Ethekwini, to many Malawian and Mozambican towns.  Also attached to 
these are very similar narratives about how rural elites – for example, in China, the 
village committee leaders – may subvert the processes to divert the gains to 
themselves.   
 
Much current research considers the changes in China’s urban hukou registration and 
what this means for migrant identities.  This, of course, resonates with issues which 
have been and still are central to urban and migration studies in southern Africa. It 
would seem there is much scope for comparative theoretical analysis about the forces 
underlying the policies on migration and urbanisation in China and  influx controls 
and their aftermaths in southern Africa, and of research on the outcomes for migrants 
themselves, along the lines already briefly indicated.  As yet, though, such 
comparative work is rather rare.32 Often, also, the work on internal migration in China 
seems less sophisticated and nuanced than the longstanding and current theorising 
about similar issues  in southern Africa.  If the purpose of the hukou system is actually 
discussed, the explanation proffered seems mainly to be ‘it makes urban labour 
cheaper’.  Well, yes, but what about the politics of the system?  And what happens to 
the ‘urban insiders’ – a category frequently identified and dicussed in apartheid South 
Africa or Southern Rhodesia? For alongside the migrant labourers exist even more 
hundreds of millions of urban Chinese who do have a full urban hukou. And that 
gives them rights to a significant range of social welfare support, and education, 
health and housing, in the cities, which, when looked at from the southern African end 
of the telescope, is quite remarkable.  
 
Another big urban process in China really captures the imagination of students 
of urbanism, and planning.  And that is the way in which urban governments there 
have created massive revenues for development via the capture by the urban state of 
the huge increases in land value generated by urban expansion and re-zoning.   This 
                                                
32 A recent exception is work by Warren Smit of the African Centre for Cities in Cape Town.  See  China-South Africa 
Urban Studies Workshop: ‘Starting from the South’: Report Back on Meeting: Cape Town, 25-27 March 2015 (Cape Town, 
2016), http://www.urbanstudiesfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Starting-from-the-South-Report-for-
Website.pdf. 
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brings us back to the centrality of modes of production and their legacies. For that 
land was nationalised under communism, and then handed to communal villages 
when agriculture was uncollectivised.  This has created possibilities which simply do 
not exist in southern Africa, or indeed Latin America or pretty much anywhere else.  
To be blunt, probably the easiest way to make money in the contemporary world is 
via property development in an area rezoned to high value urban use.  In most of the 
world that value is captured by large, private interests – a travesty which even 
conservative governments worldwide are beginning to think is a bit much given that 
the value increase is created by public sector investment and planning decisions.  For 
example, much of the massive increase in the value of land north of Durban in the 
past decades has been captured by the giant sugar corporation,Tongaat Hulett.  
Indeed, when writing this article I checked online on this process by putting ‘Tongaat 
Hulett’ and ‘Durban’ into Google, and the first thing that came up was a 2013 article 
from South Africa’s Business Day entitled: ‘Tongaat’s sugar business not as sweet as 
its property development operation’.33  There is a history dating back to colonial days, 
and a series of local power relations, and a plethora of capitalist institutions which 
underpin that situation that are utterly different from the Chinese urban narrative.   On 
the other hand, outside of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, peri-urban land 
around urban centres is often still under various forms of indigenous tenure (rather 
than capitalist freehold or leasehold tenure). As noted earlier, some potential 
comparisons can be made about how ‘villagers’ in such areas and those in China may 
participate in the provision of urban housing.  However, the history, politics and 
cultural roots of rural communities’ land rights in these societies differ enormously.  
For very many reasons, most African urban (and central) governments find it much 
more difficult to plan and capture the value of such land than their Chinese 
counterparts.  In sum, whether peripheral land required for urban ‘development’ is 
under capitalist or indigenous tenure, the Chinese urban land strategy which has 
helped to fuel that country’s urban transition is not available to Southern African (or 
most other) urban governments.   
 
Conclusions: The Urban Future and the Global South 
 
                                                
33 N. Hedley, ‘Tongaat’s sugar business not as sweet as its property development operation’, Business Day, 5 November 
2013. 
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Although the big picture is rather depressing for urban southern Africa, in 
comparative terms with BRIC countries, I do not want to end on a sour note.  As has 
also been indicated, there are some interesting and positive things happening in 
different places with urban livelihood resilience and the engagement of the local and 
central state with some of the underlying constraints on urban people’s welfare.  And 
those things are happening beyond the West.  And although this article has 
emphasised the importance of constraints, we must remember that a constraint just 
makes things more difficult, it does not prevent them altogether.  In the end I do not 
have any firm predictions about what the urban experiences of Brazil, India, China 
and other non-western developing countries tell us about the urban future of southern 
African countries. I do, however, draw attention to a chapter written by  the Africanist 
urban scholar, Garth Myers, which he entitled, ‘What if the post-metropolis is 
Lusaka?’34  It seems a good thinkpiece to mention at the end of an article on urbanism 
‘beyond the West’ which is based on a speech given at a conference held in Zambia.  
Myers’ chapter is mainly about the ubiquity of urban informality, and I would argue 
that if the governments of the Global North continue with their current  policies which 
are pulling away at the threads of the security nets which knit their urban societies 
together, informality will become increasingly rife there, too.  Indeed, the signs are 
already there.  But Myers’ piece also urges us to think about how we should study 
cities and urban lives in a world where most urban people, and an increasing share of 
urban production, are found in societies ‘beyond the West’.  And, in response to that, 
whether the post-metropolis be Zambian, or Chinese; Mozambican, or Indian; South 
Africa, or Brazilian; at least I am prepared to predict that it is not going to be Chicago, 
Los Angeles, New York or London. 
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